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And the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech .... And they
said, Go to, let us build us a city and a tower, whose top may reach unto
heaven; and let us make us a name, lest we be scattered abroad upon the face
of the whole earth .... And the Lord said, Behold, the people is one, and they
have all one language . . . and now nothing will be restrained from them,
which they have imagined to do .... [L]et us go down, and there confound
their language, that they may not understand one another's speech. 1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Not since the collapse of the Soviet Union have the subjects of mi-
nority and linguistic rights enjoyed such prominence in discussions of
the international community. Various legal commentators have sug-
gested several reasons explaining the renewed interest in the subject:
the emergence of a multi-polar world politic,2 the large-scale reap-
pearance of civil and ethnic conflicts, 3 and even the awareness of cul-
tural differences resulting from globalization.4 The atrocities that
came to light after World War II in particular made it painfully clear
to the international community the harm that had been committed
against individuals because of their membership in a particular group.
Largely as a result of that realization, the language of international
law post-World War II has sought to specifically prohibit individual
discrimination on the basis of group characteristics. Article 2 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for instance, states quite
clearly: "Everyone is entitled to all the freedoms set forth in this decla-
ration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, lan-
guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status."5
As such, the principle of non-discrimination is widely accepted as a
part of international law. What has not been so clearly included in
this sentiment, however, is the protection of the language belonging to
such groups, despite the recognition of linguistic difference as a defin-
ing feature of almost all political communities. This Article will pro-
vide a starting point in the discussion of how, in a post-Soviet globe,
different States at varying degrees of linguistic plurality can develop
the capacity to live with such differences. Part II begins by offering a
summary of arguments in favor of official language policies on the one
hand and more expansive State obligations towards the protection of
linguistic minorities on the other. Part III looks at the strength of
current and past international linguistic protections, specifically ex-
amining the trends of individualism versus group rights and negative
versus positive obligations over history. Part IV looks at the applica-
tion of linguistic protections in two case scenarios, Europe and Ca-
2. Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for
Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1, 106 (1998).
3. Steven R. Ratner, Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict?,
32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 59 (1999); Michael Walzer, Notes on the New Tribal-
ism, in POLITICAL RESTRUCTURING IN EUROPE: ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 187 (Chris
Brown ed., 1994).
4. Jan Jindy Pettman, Border Crossings/Shifting Identities: Minorities, Gender,
and the State in International Perspective, in CHALLENGING BOUNDARIES: GLOBAL
FLOWS, TERRITORIAL IDENTITIES 261, 268 (Michael J. Shapiro & Hayward R. Alker
eds., 1996).
5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 72, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
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nada, that have had widely varied results. Finally, the Article
concludes by applying the lessons learned from the international and
regional level to the situation of the Spanish-speaking minority in the
United States and proposing several considerations for the future of
linguistic protections.
II. THE THEORY BEHIND LINGUISTIC RIGHTS
AND PROTECTIONS
A. Justifications for "Official" Language Policies
Perhaps the most common response to pleas of official minority
language recognition has been the fear that such official recognition
will inevitably lead to dissolution of national unity.6 A language com-
mon to all of a nation's inhabitants has the benefit of maintaining the
political stability of the State and represents a core public culture of
shared customs, experiences and values.7 A shared language is cru-
cial in maintaining this commonality. The apprehension of an official
recognition of a nation's linguistic plurality lies in the fear that the
toleration of several languages, as opposed to the official promotion of
one, will come at the cost of discouraging linguistic minorities from
fully learning the majority language and serve to encourage national
discord.8 While divisions of race, politics, or religion challenge the so-
cial bonds that constitute a nation, linguistic differences pose a unique
problem to national unity because of their importance to communica-
tion between individuals. A breakdown in communication inevitably
leads to a breakdown in understanding, which in turn is conducive to
intolerance and further national disunity-seen in this light, the gov-
ernment has substantial interests in protecting the whole of society
from the divisive effects of multilingualism. Thus, many States and
nations seek to declare their majority language the "official" language
as an assertion of cultural and political hegemony with the message to
linguistic minorities being one of implied exclusion.
A second common argument favoring an official language policy is
that of economic practicality. Proponents of official language policies
argue that the cost of providing services in minority languages justi-
fies granting official status to the language spoken by the majority.
Training teachers for bilingual education, printing multiple types of
ballots, providing government services in several different lan-
guages-all of these adjustments come at a cost, proponents say, a
6. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., THE DIsuNITING OF AMERICA 62 (1991) ("[A] com-
mon language is a necessary bond of national cohesion in so heterogeneous a na-
tion as America.").
7. 142 CONG. REC. H9730 (1996) (statement of Rep. Roth).
8. See generally Frank M. Lowrey IV, Through the Looking Glass: Linguistic Sepa-
ratism and National Unity, 41 EMORY L.J. 223 (1992).
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cost that the State is under no obligation to foot. To the contrary, a
State has the obligation to ensure that its citizenry is equipped, to the
best extent possible, with a solid education and training for success.
Given the direct correlation between ability to speak English and in-
come levels in the United States,9 proponents of official language poli-
cies argue that such policies will serve to broaden opportunities to
people not speaking the majority language. In this sense, the argu-
ment goes, the promotion of an official language policy would ensure
that all members of a State can grow up fluent in the majority lan-
guage and thus be able to communicate with most individuals residing
in the same State. This was part of the fear driving the campaign
against bi-lingual education in the Southwestern United States: the
idea that the promotion of a language other than English in public
schools would lead to generations of students ill-equipped in English
language fluency, which would in turn financially and logistically bur-
den other taxpayers. Tibetan schoolchildren have had such an experi-
ence.' 0 Having graduated from primary schools taught in the Tibetan
language, these children (and their parents) years later face the
daunting task of stiff competition when attempting to get into Chinese
language universities.ll In effect, providing schooling in the minority
language served to leave these Tibetan children in a less advanta-
geous educational-and later economic-position in society.12
Similarly, the implementation of an official language policy also
has the potential of encouraging newcomers to learn the majority lan-
guage and culture, which in turn will limit the initial isolation into
ethnic/linguistic enclaves and encourage greater participation in soci-
ety. Recent immigrants in most countries tend to reside in immigrant
communities, where their native language is freely spoken and one
can almost entirely live without needing fluency in the majority lan-
guage. Official language legislation would strive to eliminate that lin-
guistic divide by requiring recent immigrants to learn the language of
the majority and begin social integration early on. Seen in this light,
official language provisions are inclusive rather than exclusive-they
would be responsible for easing the integration of linguistic minorities
into the mainstream society and encouraging their full political
participation. 13
9. Brief for Linguistic Society of America and National Council for Languages and
International Studies as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 21-25,
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (no. 95-974).
10. Ruling Classes, ECONOMIST, Jan. 9, 1993, at 34.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Brief for Washington Legal Foundation et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioners at 23-30, Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997)
(No. 95-974).
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B. Arguments for the Protection of Linguistic Minority
Rights
It is a fair statement that most countries are not mono-ethnic, nor
are they mono-lingual; on the contrary, because the territorial bound-
aries of the nation-state are often at odds with the delineation of cul-
tural and linguistic groups, most States have a plurality of languages
spoken within their borders. For instance, most States belonging to
the United Nations have several ethnic groups and two or more spo-
ken languages within their territorial boundaries. 14 So before any
discussion on official language policy gets underway, it is worthy to
note that the goal of establishing a mono-lingual society through such
policies may very well be purely an ideal not necessarily rooted in
reality.
Likewise, arguments in favor of officially promoting a majority lan-
guage to the extreme of restricting the usage of a minority language
are often flawed in that they do not consider the unique role that lan-
guage has in the formation and maintenance of a cultural and/or eth-
nic identity. One's choice of language is arguably a choice freely made,
since the survival and flourishing of a group's culture quite often de-
pends on the vitality of its language-which, in turn, depends on the
language being spoken. Language is a means, often the only one, with
which group members communicate with one another, and a threat to
the language is very much a threat to the existence of the culture
itself.
At the most basic level and in a somewhat Machiavellian sense, an
argument in favor of language rights is supported by a security justifi-
cation; that is, the idea that prohibiting individuals from engaging in
their native language could very well lead to increased internal con-
flict and reactionary antagonism that would threaten the security of
the international community. This decree is best encapsulated in the
1992 U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities: "[Considering that] the
promotion and protection of the rights of persons belonging to national
or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities contribute to the political
and social stability of States in which they live . ... "15 From this
perspective, a State exchanges allowing linguistic freedom of certain
minority groups in return for security of territorial integrity and im-
plied assurances against ethnic conflicts.
14. Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of Ethnic Mi-
norities, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 615 (1992).
15. Lauri Malksoo, Language Rights in International Law: Why the Phoenix is Still
in the Ashes, 12 FLA. J. INT'L L. 431, 435 (2000); see also ATHANASIA SPILIOPOULOU
AKERMARK, JUSTIFICATIONS OF MINORITY PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 182
(1997).
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The support of language rights from an individual rights perspec-
tive views such rights as universal human rights, for which member-
ship in a minority group is not required. While not necessarily
contradicting the above security justification, the individual right to
one's own language is here focused on justice for individuals, stressing
that even without the possibility of sectarian conflict the denial of an
individual's linguistic rights would be unjust. 16 Individual rights con-
sist of rights that apply to every individual based on his or her State
citizenship, upholding the individual as the primary moral unit. The
individualist proposes that such linguistic-rights discourse allows for
the adequate protection of linguistic minorities, assuming individual
rights are granted and properly maintained. For instance, individual
rights as to freedom of expression and association should both ensure
that linguistic minorities are free to form, maintain and preserve their
distinctive groups and identities. Equality in rights presupposes re-
spect for an individual's identity as a human being; given that lan-
guage is a fundamental dimension of such an identity, respect for
individual rights is innately intertwined with respect for a person's
language. This viewpoint is best exemplified in the international com-
munity's change of thought following World War II, discussed infra
Part III, that linguistic rights could best be protected through interna-
tional protection that made such rights universal and not restricted
according to group membership. 17
A third approach that has been advocated by some is the protection
of language rights on a group rights basis-that is, that an individ-
ual's right to speak his or her native language is protected because of
his or her membership in a particular, protected group.' 8 Collective
group rights are a new addition to the human rights concept; while far
from being accepted by the whole of the international community,
they have certainly added a new dimension to the debate over linguis-
16. For more on the debate between individual and group rights, see Thomas W. Si-
mon, Prevent Harms First: Minority Protection in International Law, 9 INT'L LE-
GAL PERSP. 129 (1997), and PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
RIGHTS OF MINORITIES (1991).
17. See, for example, Article 27 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights: "In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist,
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community
with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
practice their own religion, or to use their own language." International Cove-
nant of Civil and Political Rights, art. 27, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [here-
inafter ICCPR]; see also David Wippman, The Evolution and Implementation if
Minority Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 597 (1997).
18. See generally Philip Vuciri Ramaga, The Group Concept in Minority Protection,
15 HuM. RTs. Q. 575 (1993); Richard H. Thompson, Ethnic Minorities and the
Case for Collective Rights, 99 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 786 (1997).
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tic protections. 19 Such group rights emphasize "the existence of a
group as a political, social and juridical entity independent from the
individual and from society as a whole"20 and promote the idea of
group protection against external attempts to weaken or replace
group-identity. 2 1 Like individual rights, group rights also work as a
restraint on the majority's ability to disadvantage linguistic minori-
ties; unlike individual rights, however, group rights do so by empower-
ing and protecting the linguistic group as a whole. 2 2 On the one hand,
language is a personal matter closely associated with personal iden-
tity; but on the other hand, it is also a tool of social organization and
thus serves a societal purpose. 23 Promoters of group rights recognize
that most modern societies are governed to a significant degree by a
dominant group exercising hegemony over minorities within the terri-
torial boundaries of the State and that it is, at minimum, this hegem-
ony that constitutes a threat to the cultural integrity of said groups
and thus calls for the protection and preservation of the minority
culture.24
Although States have been reluctant to recognize language rights
as "group rights,"25 there is a recognized, inherent difficulty in ad-
dressing a problem that is so tightly wound in the collective exper-
iences of a group solely in terms of the individual. The continued
existence of a linguistic and cultural group can often be secured only
through the means of allowing enough group members to develop cul-
turally outside the dominant paradigms of the majority culture-for a
minority culture to survive in the modern era, the group's language
must be one of the languages used in public life. In practice, this
means nothing less than permitting courts, legislatures, the education
system and even mass media to be conducted with significant defer-
ence to the language of the minority.2 6 Seen from this light, individu-
alist prohibitions against discrimination and protections of an
19. Ellen Messer, Anthropology and Human Rights, 22 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY
221 (1993).
20. James D. Wilets, The Demise of the Nation-State: Towards a New Theory of the
State Under International Law, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 193, 207 (1999) (citing
PATRICK THORNBERRY, MINORITIES AND HuMAN RIGHTS LAW: A MINORITY RIGHTS
GROUP REPORT (1991)).
21. Ilan Saban, Minority Rights in Deeply Divided Societies: A Framework for Analy-
sis and the Case of the Arab-Palestinian Minority in Israel, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L &
POL. 885, 906-07 (2004); see also YAEL TAMIR, LIBERAL NATIONALISM 35-37
(1993); DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY 120-54 (1995).
22. WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY
RIGHTS 45-47 (1995).
23. The Oslo Recommendations Regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minori-
ties and Explanatory Note, 6 INT'L J. ON MINORITY AND GROUP RTs. 359, 360
(1999).
24. Thompson, supra note 18, at 789.
25. Id.
26. Saban, supra note 21, at 905-06.
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individual's right of association are not enough to prevent the disap-
pearance of a minority language, since economic and cultural pres-
sures to assimilate will do their work to displace the linguistic
minority. Because linguistic and ethnic identities are usually so se-
curely intertwined with one another, controversies over the right to
use one's language will inevitably involve issues of collectivity. 2 7 Indi-
vidualist rights rhetoric, from this perspective, is thus fundamentally
flawed because of its refusal to undertake preventative, group-focused
measures to protect linguistic minorities.28
Addressing the issue of linguistic rights from a group paradigm
has its own flaws, however. For instance, before addressing the ques-
tion of linguistic protection one must first determine which language
needs such protection; given the variety of techniques, criteria and
definitions used, it is easy to see how this issue is far from clear.2 9 In
the wake of globalization even the speakers of some major languages
feel that their language may be lost or diluted under free market con-
ditions. 30 Likewise, there is no one characterization that has been
universally accepted by international law as the definitive word on
what constitutes a minority group, although various observers have
made note of the formulation belonging to the Special Rapporteur of
the U.N. Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities:31
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-
dominant position, whose members-being nationals of the State-possess
ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of
the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed to-
wards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language. 3 2
While not the official, sanctioned definition, Caportorti's articulation
is certainly the most widely used and concurs with standard sociologi-
cal notions of minorities as groups ethnically distinct from the major-
ity and under the political and cultural hegemony of the majority
culture. 3 3
Finally, another relevant question is whether a meritable distinc-
tion can be made between historical, established minorities and immi-
grants. Established linguistic minorities are those individuals that
27. Malksoo, supra note 15, at 443.
28. KYMLICKA, supra note 22, at 110-11.
29. Malksoo, supra note 15, at 449.
30. Id. at 445-46 (noting the example of French speakers in Canada).
31. Dilek Kurban, Confronting Equality: The Need for Constitutional Protection of
Minorities on Turkey's Path to the European Union, 35 COLuM. Hum. RTs. L. REV.
151, 158-59 (2003).
32. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot.
Of Minorities, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and
Linguistic Minorities, $ 568, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1 (1979) (prepared
by Francesco Capotorti) [hereinafter Capotorti Report].
33. Thompson, supra note 18, at 790.
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have been incorporated into the larger political framework of the
State, be it by choice or not. Will Kymlicka best describes established
linguistic minorities as "historically settled, territorially concentrated
and previously self-governing cultures whose territory has become in-
corporated into a larger State. The incorporation of such groups has
typically been involuntary, due to colonization, conquest or the trans-
fer of territory between imperial powers, but in some cases reflects a
voluntary federation."3 4
Immigrant linguistic minorities, on the other hand, have con-
sciously made the decision to leave their country of origin and make a
new home in their adoptive country. This distinction between "genu-
ine" national minorities and "immigrants" came up during the draft-
ing discussions of Article 27, and it is a generally accepted notion that
the former is entitled to more linguistic rights.35 Still, from a theoreti-
cal perspective, it is not clear that such a distinction is supported from
a group-rights standpoint if both established minorities and immi-
grant minorities are members of the same or similarly protected
group. In the United States, for instance, the Hispanic population is
comprised of both families having resided in the Southwest years
before statehood as well as recent immigrants from Latin America-
and yet, restrictions against Spanish in the workplace continue. 36
Lastly, there is some merit to the preservation of linguistic diver-
sity for its own sake. The motivation behind linguistic and cultural
preservation here is the belief that they signify thousands of alterna-
tive ways of life that could potentially enrich the human experience
for many. The death or extinction of any one of these languages repre-
sents a blow to the cultural capital of humanity and leaves a gap in
the cultural heritage of mankind.3 7 Like the effort towards the envi-
ronmental protection of endangered species, several notable organiza-
tions, such as the Association International Pour la Defence des
Langues et Cultures Menacees ("AIDLMC"), have formed to prevent
the further extinction of languages. This problem has also been recog-
nized internationally: Article 7 of the Declaration on the Responsibili-
ties of the Present Generations Towards Future Generations bestows
34. WILL KYMLICKA, STATES, NATIONS AND CULTURES 19 (1997); see also WILL KYM-
LICKA, FINDING OUR WAY: RETHINKING ETHNOCULTURAL RELATIONS IN CANADA 2-3
(1998); Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALSM: EXAM-
INING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994).
35. Louis B. Sohn, The Rights of Minorities, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS:
THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 281 (Louis Henkin ed. 1981);
Adeno Addis, Cultural Integrity and Political Unity: The Politics of Language in
Multilingual States, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 719, 762-764 (2001).
36. Reynaldo F. Macias, Bilingual Workers and Language Use Rules in the Work-
place: A Case Study of a Nondiscriminatory Language Policy, 127 INT'L J. Soc.
LANGUAGE 53 (1997).
37. TovE SKUTNABB-KANGAS & ROBERT PHILLIPSON, WANTED! LINGUISTIC HUMAN
RIGHTS 3 (1989).
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on the present generation the obligation to "take care to preserve the
cultural diversity of humankind. The present generations have the re-
sponsibility to identify, protect and safeguard the tangible and intan-
gible cultural heritage and to transmit this common heritage to future
generations."38
III. GLOBAL PROTECTION OF LINGUISTIC RIGHTS
A focus on the individual has dominated international rights dis-
course since World War II, with the slightest hints of change noticea-
ble only in recent years. For instance, both the U.N. Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights promoted a rights discourse
based on a conference on individuals, and neither made any mention
of minority rights generally. 3 9 Subsequent international agreements,
however, appear to have at least taken note of rights inherent to an
individual by virtue of a group membership. There is no question that
international law continues to emphasize individual, not group,
rights-even where certain rights have been outlined as a result of an
individual's group membership, these rights are, in the vast majority
of cases, rights inherent in members of the group rather than the
groups themselves. Even so, there is a growing movement to broaden
and grow collective group rights from mere issues of debate to inclu-
sion in more substantive international agreements, especially with re-
gard to those group rights aimed at minority and ethnic groups, with
the recognition that individualist human rights are simply not enough
to protect and ensure the survival of the group's culture and language.
The United Nations Charter, the document that led to the creation
of the United Nations, is perhaps one of the best known international
agreements. Signed and entered into force in 1945, it was meant to
substitute the League of Nations and originally consisted of represent-
atives of twenty-six nations pledging to fight together against the Axis
Powers. 40 Since then it has expanded its aims and goals to become
the primary international organization of the post-Soviet world and
the foremost agency for achieving world peace. The Charter itself
makes extensive note of the protection of individual rights and liber-
ties; section 3 of the first article, for instance, is explicit about securing
individual freedoms: "(The purpose of the U.N. is to encourage] re-
spect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."41 But in this arche-
typical international document no mention is made of group rights,
38. Id. at 6.
39. Charles Furtado, Jr., Guess Who's Coming to Dinner? Protection for National Mi-
norities in Eastern and Central Europe Under the Council of Europe, 34 COLUM.
Hum. RTS. L. REV. 333, 335-37 (2003).
40. See U.N. Charter.
41. Id. art. 1, para. 3.
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much less linguistic minority rights. The fundamental freedoms de-
lineated above and throughout the Charter presumably apply to indi-
viduals inherently, and not by virtue of any group membership.
Likewise, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR")
takes on an individualist, not group-oriented, perspective on the pres-
ervation of human rights.42 Its guarantees of "life, liberty and secur-
ity of person," as well as protections against "torture or . . . cruel,
inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment," are aimed at indi-
viduals.4 3 It does, however, acknowledge the importance of protecting
against discrimination based on group identities such as "race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social ori-
gin, property, birth or other status."44 Even so, it frames such protec-
tion against discrimination in individualistic terms, emphasizing that
the delineated rights are an entitlement of individuals: "Everyone is
entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration,
without distinction of any kind . . ... "45 Although not legally binding,
the UDHR directly led to the creation of more than sixty human rights
instruments that together constitute international human rights
discourse.
From 1948 to 1966, the international community struggled to
agree on an international covenant on human rights that would turn
this declaration into binding international law. In the context of the
Cold War, however, the international split along ideologies manifested
itself in a political debate over the UDHR's granting of civil, political,
economic, social and cultural rights.4 6 While the UDHR's provisions
outlining both civil and political rights were supported by capitalist
nations, its provisions protecting economic, social and cultural rights
were more favored by communist nations. This division of support,
while paralyzing the UDHR by keeping it nonbinding, also led to the
creation of two binding covenants that effectively separated the types
of rights neatly along the division of support: the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR").47 To-
gether with the UDHR, these three covenants comprise the Interna-
tional Bill of Rights.
The ICCPR symbolizes the beginning of a change in international
rights rhetoric from one overly focused on protection of linguistic mi-
nority rights through individualist principles to one that is more open
42. UDHR, supra note 5.
43. Id. art. 3, 5.
44. Id. art. 2.
45. Id.
46. HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT
138-39 (Oxford 2000).
47. Id. at 139-41.
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to considering the benefits of group-oriented rights.48 Based on the
ideals and goals of the UDHR, the ICCPR entered into force March 23,
1976 as a way to make the civil and political provisions of the UDHR a
binding treaty.4 9
The ICCPR appears to begin with an individualistic perspective.
Article 1 of the ICCPR, for instance, is nearly identical to the implicit
individual protections set down in the UDHR above: "All peoples have
the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely de-
termine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development." 50 Article 2 follows suit, requiring States
to ensure that the human rights of all individuals within their terri-
tory and subject to their jurisdiction will be ensured and respected
"without distinction of any kind such as . . . language .... "51 Simi-
larly, Article 26 of the ICCPR attempts to outline linguistic minority
protections still within an individualistic framework by securing an
individual's right to nondiscrimination. The text of Article 26 explic-
itly prohibits individuals from being harmed because of their affilia-
tion with certain types of groups, forbidding States from
discriminating on the basis of language, national origin, and birth:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimina-
tion to equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, re-
ligion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.5 2
The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities ("the Sub-Commission"), the expert body largely respon-
sible for shaping the tone of the ICCPR,53 went so far as to define the
prevention of discrimination as "the prevention of any action which
denies to individuals or groups of people equality of treatment which
they may wish"5 4 during drafting. To the extent that it offers linguis-
tic minorities any protection, the anti-discrimination protections of
Article 26 are still framed in terms of the individual: its anti-discrimi-
natory rights aim to prevent discrimination against individuals, not
groups. The protections guaranteeing the freedoms of peaceful assem-
bly and association in Articles 21 and 22 are similarly focused.55
48. Id. at 142-45.
49. Id. at 708-09.
50. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 1; see also International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights art. 1, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3
(entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCRI.
51. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 2.
52. Id. art. 26.
53. Simon, supra note 16, at 133-36.
54. Capotorti Report, supra note 32, J 236.
55. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 21, 22.
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Article 25, however, is more specific in ensuring that every mem-
ber of the State citizenry has a right to full political participation:
"[Everyone is entitled to] take part in the conduct of public affairs,
directly or through freely chosen representatives; [t]o vote and to be
elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and
equal suffrage . . . guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the
electors."56 Although at first impression Article 25 looks to imply a
limited form of linguistic group rights, various legal commentators
have suggested the potential of extending Article 25 to ensure linguis-
tic protections: if a State's elections do not allow the entirety of the
electorate to play a meaningful role in the political process, and thus
leads to poor representation of the minority population, then it can be
argued that the State is affirmatively obligated to ensure proper rep-
resentation. 5 7 Because the elections do not accurately represent the
expressed will of the minority group, an argument could very well be
made that a duty lies within the State to take action protecting the
political rights of all of its constituents. The same argument could be
extended to Article 19's guarantees of freedom of expression, as it in-
cludes the "freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
of all kinds, regardless of frontiers" as well as the right to do so in the
medium or language of an individual's choosing.58
Article 27 of the ICCPR is perhaps the best known provision hav-
ing a direct bearing on the linguistic rights of minorities. Even so,
these protections proved to be a hard task during the drafting of Arti-
cle 27, with the Sub-Commission settled on the following proposal:
In states inhabited by well-defined ethnic, linguistic or other religious groups
which are clearly distinguished from the rest of the population, and which
want to be accorded differential treatment, persons belonging to such groups
shall have the right, as far as is compatible with public order and security, to
establish and maintain their schools and cultural or religious institutions, and
to use their own language and script in the press, in public assembly and
before the courts and other authorities of the State, if they so choose.5 9
The finished version became Article 27, although it was a significantly
paler shadow of its former self: "In those states in which ethnic, relig-
ious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minori-
ties shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and
56. Id. art. 25.
57. Wilets, supra note 20, at 219.
58. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 19. While Article 19(1) grants individuals "the right
to hold opinions without interference," Article 19(2) details the right to 'seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, ei-
ther orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of
his choice." Id.
59. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot.
Of Minorities, Report of the Commission on Human Rights, art. 3, U.N. Doc. E/
600/Annex A (Dec. 17, 1947).
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practice their own religion, or to use their own language."60 Com-
pared to the proposed version, Article 27 also vested protection rights
in individuals, not groups, and imposed only passive obligations upon
States.6 1 Even so, Article 27 went a step further than Article 26 did in
recognizing the existence of rights inherent to a group and its mem-
bers, rights surfacing only in relation to membership in a set, pre-de-
fined community. And because of that legal commentators have
pointed out Article 27 as the only global provision of a legally binding
nature guaranteeing minorities their language and culture. 6 2
Although the ICCPR goes further than previous international de-
crees in not only directly addressing linguistic rights of minorities but
also in asserting the protection of that right, the degree of the obliga-
tion conferred on a State is unclear. Are States compelled to just pro-
tect minorities enough so that they can freely exercise their native
language, or do they have an affirmative duty to encourage and culti-
vate said language? Does a State fulfill its obligation so long as it does
not pass laws restricting the use of the language, or must it affirma-
tively help enable those minorities to cultivate and use their lan-
guage? Article 27 above, for instance, says little with regard as to
whether it grants minority groups an equal claim on State resources
for schools, minority businesses, and/or cultural institutions. More
generally still, does the text of Article 27 even require States to assist
in the identity formation and maintenance of all minority groups?
The ambiguity continues when one sees that there is no definition of
what should constitute a linguistic minority, and even more that there
remains opportunity for States to deny their very existence still.63
However, perhaps linguistic minorities should be thankful for the am-
biguity, given the individualistic trend in international rights dis-
course that is only now, arguably, changing-stronger linguistic
protections may have been rejected by the international community
outright. As such, the trend in international law towards bestowing
more positive obligations on States encourages a broader reading of
Article 27, based on the view that affirmative duties going beyond
non-discrimination and equality protections are necessary for the
functioning of the entire article. 64
The third and final treaty that makes up the International Bill of
Rights is the ICESCR, which was adopted and opened for signature
December 1966 and entered into force January 1976 in accordance
60. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 27.
61. Simon, supra note 16, at 135-36.
62. Id. at 132.
63. See Wilets, supra note 20, at 204-07.
64. ICCPR, supra note 17, art. 27 (referring only to "ethnic . . . or linguistic
minorities").
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with ICCPR's Article 27.65 Together with the UDHR and the ICCPR,
the ICESCR was created with the recognition that an individual's en-
joyment of civil and political freedoms is conditioned on his or her abil-
ity to also enjoy their economic, social and cultural rights. The
Preamble is clear that "the ideal of free human beings enjoying free-
dom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created
whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights,
as well as his civil and political rights ... "66 The ICESCR thus
serves to enshrine the economic, social and cultural rights contained
in the UDHR in a more developed and legally binding form, and to this
day remains the foremost international document on these rights.
The ICESCR is explicit in protecting an individual's right to partici-
pate in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of his or her culture,
going as far as to outline the duty of the State to preserve, develop and
disseminate this culture. 67
Despite numerous signatories, the ICESCR continues to be handi-
capped because of the refusal of several influential States to fully rec-
ognize individual claims to the recognition and defense of these
human rights. The United States, for instance, has in the past limited
economic, social and cultural rights to
goals that can only be achieved progressively, not guarantees. Therefore,
while access to food, health services and quality education are the top of any
list of development goals, to speak of them as rights turns the citizens of de-
veloping countries into objects of development rather than subjects in control
of their own destiny.6 8
Thus, the United States has expressed refrain from ratifying certain
significant provisions of the ICESCR, and has expressed reservation
on several other economic, social and cultural rights standards.
Sadly, although the perspective of the United States is not unique, the
ICESCR should be recognized as a step forward in the direction of a
more complete protection of linguistic minorities.
The period following the breakup of Yugoslavia, the process of uni-
fication in Europe, and the increasing empowerment of indigenous
communities throughout the world,69 among other events, led to a
change in international human rights language and subsequently to a
more open discourse on group-differentiated rights. Attempting to go
65. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 46, 242-48.
66. ICESCR, supra note 50, at 5.
67. Id. art. 15.
68. Katarina Toma~evski, Unasked Questions About Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights From the Experience of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education
(1998-2004): A Response to Kenneth Roth, Leonard S. Rubenstein, and Mary
Robinson, 27 HuM. RTs. Q. 713, 719 (2005) (citing U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council,
Comm'n Hum. Rts., Comments Submitted by the United States of America, Report
of the Open-ended Working Group on the Right to Development, 8, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/2001/26 (2001)).
69. Saban, supra note 21, at 917 n.121.
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beyond the rights outlined in the ICCPR and seeking to impose more
affirmative obligations on nation-states, the U.N. General Assembly
adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Persons Belonging to Na-
tional or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities ("G.A. Declara-
tion") in 1992.70 The first and second Articles bound the joining
nation-states to taking the necessary steps towards protecting the lin-
guistic rights of minorities to use their own language and their right
to be involved in governmental decision-making. 7 1 "States shall pro-
tect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious, and
linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and
shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity [and]
shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve
those ends."7 2
Article 2(1) articulates that national minorities have the right "to
use their own language, in private and in public, freely and without
interference or any form of discrimination."73 Despite the G.A. Decla-
ration's noble effort to expand linguistic rights, it suffered from a flaw
all too common to most international agreements: in an attempt to
accommodate the different levels of commitment among its signato-
ries, the delineated duties were quite limited and did not even man-
date a State to provide the necessary resources for the teaching of and
in the minority tongue. Further handicapping any expansion of lin-
guistic rights was the fact that the G.A. Declaration was not legally
binding on the member States.
The above international agreements serve as a testament to the
changing face of international human rights discourse. While initially
human rights were limited to those very basic needs-a right to food,
shelter, freedom to live-a new era of international human rights pro-
tections expands to include certain social, economic and even cultural
protections. However, what makes international documents and insti-
tutions the most ambitious is also an inherent weakness: the flexibil-
ity granted to States often translates into a limited reach and a
document without much enforcement power. For instance, the Uni-
versal Declaration of Linguistic Rights ("UDLR") is perhaps the most
impressive and forward-thinking document on the protection of lin-
guistic rights, and it was drafted with the belief that such a declara-
tion was necessary in order to correct linguistic inequality and
endangerment. 74 Signed in 1996 by several non-governmental organi-
70. Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious
and Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No.
49, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992).
71. Id. art. 1, 2.
72. Id. art. 1.
73. Id. art. 2, para. 1.
74. Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights, June 9, 1996, available at www.
unesco.org/cpp/uk/declarations/linguistic.pdf.
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zations, the UDLR is based on the recognition of language's impor-
tance to individual identity and aims to protect all languages,
endangered or otherwise, from extinction; however, because its only
signatories are non-governmental organizations, the UDLR is consid-
erably limited in its effectiveness. Even so, there are certainly bene-
fits to an internationally-agreed upon minimum standard of language
rights, as they serve as a guide to the regional application of linguistic
protections discussed infra Part IV.
IV. THE REGIONAL ALTERNATIVE
A. Canada
The protection of linguistic minority rights has only recently been
introduced in international human rights discourse, but development
of the concept has been hampered by a variety of factors: definitional
problems, selective application, weakness inherent to international in-
stitutions, and the competing ideals of sovereignty, nationalism and
assimilation.75 Canada provides an excellent example of where the
official recognition of more than one language has lead to internal con-
flict along linguistic lines. The uneasy union of English and French
offers a context in which to observe how effective linguistic accommo-
dation measures by a State government can be.
The origin of Canada's linguistic troubles comes from its colonial
founding by Great Britain and France. Initially sharing the territory
that would later become Canada, the 1763 Treaty of Paris granted
French territories in the North American continent over to Great Brit-
ain.76 The British English-speaking population soon spread over most
of the Canadian territory, while the original French-speaking minor-
ity remained concentrated near the shores of the Great Lakes and the
land that would later become Quebec.7 7 Early efforts to recognize the
bilingual status of the Canadian territories took the form of territorial
partitions, with Britain's Constitution Act of 1891 dividing up the
country into Upper and Lower Canada. The partition left Canada
with British-Protestant and French-Catholic regions, respectively,
and granted official status to both languages in the legislature of
75. Dominic McGoldrick, Canadian Indians, Cultural Rights and the Human Rights
Committee, 40 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 658, 658 (1991); Patrick Thornberry, Self-De-
termination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments,
38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 867-89 (1989). See generally HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY,
SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION (1991); NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS
AND DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1990).
76. Maxwell F. Yalden, The Bilingual Experience in Canada, in THE NEW BILINGUAL-
ISM 71 (Martin Ridge ed., 1981).
77. Frank M. Lowrey, IV, Comment, Through the Looking Glass: Linguistic Separa-
tism and National Unity, 41 EMORY L.J. 223, 224 (1992).
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Lower Canada. 78 This effort was unsuccessful, however, and only en-
couraged disturbances along linguistic and cultural divides. Ulti-
mately, the bilingual character of the Canadian nation was
incorporated into the British North America Act ("BNA"), but still the
language rights of minorities varied from province to province, with
some expressing tolerance and others repression. 79
The 1960s only made the linguistic divide more apparent, as a re-
newed government commitment to bilingualism clashed visibly with
Quebec's developing nationalism. The implementation of the Official
Languages Act ("OLA") in 1969 embodied the idea that Canadian indi-
viduals be allowed to choose the language of their choice and that such
a choice should not be restricted to the language being used in a par-
ticular region.S0 The goal was to fix the problems of separatism by
"making French-speaking Canadians at home . . . in Vancouver and
Toronto as well as Montreal."S1 Even with such official encourage-
ment, however, English-speakers continued to dominate the financial
and commercial capital of Montreal and served to drive the fear of
English as a threat to the preservation of French culture within Ca-
nada. More and more political activity focused on language issues in
the 1960s and 1970s, and eventually the popular consensus in Quebec
was the protection of the French language in view of the assimilative
power of English. The voters of Quebec expressed their support of offi-
cial unilingualism by passing Bill 22, which purported to revoke the
official recognition of English as the national language, required all
laws and regulations to be in French, and targeted the assimilation
occurring in English-language schools.82 The French Language Char-
ter (Bill 101), passed in 1977, represented a further circumvention of
federal language policy, as it required the legislature to take a variety
of affirmative measures to ensure the continued French Nature of the
Quebec province.83
Perhaps in part because of the Quebec population's circumvention
of bilingual legislation, the English provinces have been resistant to
implement the goals of the OLA and hesitant to implement the bilin-
gual public services it outlines. The general sentiment among most of
Canada's English speakers has been a feeling that "they, the majority,
78. Id. (citing MARC V. LEVINE, THE RECONQUEST OF MONTREAL 25-26 (1990)).
79. 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5 (Appendix 1970).
80. Milton J. Esman, The Politics of Official Bilingualism in Canada, in LANGUAGE
POLICY AND NATIONAL UNITY 45 (William R. Beer & James E. Jacob eds., 1985).
While the OLA made French the official national language, it provided for the
provision of federal and provincial services in either language as well as financial
support for second language education and schooling. Id.
81. Lowrey, supra note 77, at 230 (citing MARC V. LEVINE, THE RECONQUEST OF MON-
TREAL 25-26 (1990)).
82. Official Language Act, 1974 S.Q., ch. 6 (1974) (Can.)
83. Charter of the French Language, R.S.Q., ch. C-11 (1977).
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were being asked to bear all the material and symbolic costs of a pro-
gram that they did not consider necessary, in order to buy support for
Canada from an unreasonable and undeserving minority."8 4
The future of Canada's linguistic divide can perhaps be gleaned
from the late demise of the Meech Lake Accord, a constitutional com-
promise drafted in 1987 to assuage Quebec's fears of a diminishing
French character.8 5 The Accord failed to ratify because of two key
provisions: one recognizing Quebec's right to protect its status as a
"distinct society" and another restricting English-language rights.
8 6
Because Newfoundland and Manitoba rebuked the provisions of the
accord that allowed Quebec to control language use within its terri-
tory, the rest of the agreement-which included immigration, senate
reform, and the amendment process, among other topics-was eventu-
ally scrapped. On a greater level, the failure of the Accord symbolized
something with much greater implications on Canadian society: the
interpretation of the Accord's rejection as symbolic of Quebec's rejec-
tion by the rest of English-speaking Canada.8 7 The Human Rights
Committee was even asked to intervene in the Ballantyne case, where
the government of Quebec refused to allow nation English speakers
living in Quebec the right to advertise their business with English-
only signs.8 8 Currently the status of the debate is one of an impasse,
although the internal politics of Quebec have been marked by a
marked increase in the incorporation of separatist sentiments, once
reserved to the radical fringe, in mainstream political dialogue.8 9
Quebec's newfound interest in considering secession options, in con-
junction with an increased weakening of national unity among all the
provinces has led some scholars to propose that the dissolution of the
Canadian confederacy is only a question of time.9 0
The experience of the Canadian nation provides an important les-
son for nations considering any kind of linguistic protection for their
minority populations but wary of the real risk of political division and
national disunity. Even after centuries of official state-sanctioned bi-
lingualism policies attempting to establish political parity between
84. Esman, supra note 80, at 54-55.
85. PETER W. HoGG, MEECH LAKE CONSTITUIONAL ACCORD ANNOTATED 3 (1988).
86. Lowrey, supra note 77, at 253-54.
87. Id. at 258.
88. John Ballantyne, Elizabeth Davidson, and Gordon McIntyre v. Canada, Comm.
Nos. 359/1989 and 385/1989, Report of the Human Rights Comm., U.N. GAOR,
48th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 91-109, U.N. Doc. A/48/40 (Nov. 1, 1993); see also
William Green, Schools, Signs, and Separation: Quebec Anglophones, Canadian
Constitutional Politics, and International Language Rights, 27 DENV. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 449, 461 (1999).
89. Barry Came, A Growing Sense of Alienation: Quebecers Review Their Options,
MACLEAN'S, Mar. 13, 1990, at 20-21.
90. See generally Greg W. Taylor, The Forces of Division, MACLEAN'S, Nov. 20, 1989,
at 30, 32.
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the English and French languages, only sixteen percent of Canadians
consider themselves bilingual.91 While Canada is still at heart a bilin-
gual nation, the nature of its bilingualism continues to be structured
around territorial lines, and the result is several unilingual provinces
under one divided country's flag.
B. Eastern & Central Europe
The creation of the League of Nations following World War I was
motivated, at least in great part, by the recognition that escalating
minority tensions in Eastern Europe had contributed significantly to
the War and with the goal of preventing similar conflicts in the fu-
ture.9 2 As what some authors have aptly called the "first truly inter-
national system of minority protection," the League worked as a
system of minority protection that sought to promote the right to be
free from discrimination and even implied affirmative duties upon the
State towards minority groups though a system of treaties.9 3 But the
emergence of World War II clearly marked the blatant failure of the
League of Nations in preventing further international hostilities, and
with the demise of the League in 1946 came the end of its minority
protections.
On a grander scale, however, the Nazi Party's promotion of group
rights and its pursuit of racial purity during its European invasion led
the international community to be increasingly wary of protectionist
rhetoric that could be similarly abused in the future, and thus more
cautious about any support of group rights.94 International rights
rhetoric thus underwent a fundamental change after World War II,
and became one focused on protecting the rights of individuals
through a universal system not predicated on any type of group mem-
bership. The philosophy behind international rights discourse now be-
came directed universally at all individuals in all countries, and not
limited by group or country. Europe followed suit, and most of its
post-World War II agreements and institutions have demonstrated
the same commitment to a universally-applicable system of human
rights.
Adopted by the Council of Europe on November 4, 1950, the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamen-
tal Freedoms ("European Convention") continued the trend of the
91. Peter Brimelow, Divorce to the North?, FORBES, June 11, 1990, at 56, 60.
92. NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7
(1991).
93. Wilets, supra note 20, at 204-07.
94. LERNER, supra note 92, at 11-14.
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protection of the individual.95 Group rights are largely ignored, pro-
tected only to the extent that individual group members are able to
exercise their enumerated rights-groups, per se, have no legal status
before the European Court, as petitions must be filed by a "person,
non-governmental organization or group of individuals claiming to be
the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the
rights set forth in this Convention ... ."96 In addition, the protection
of minorities is further hurt by the lack of any similar counterpart to
Article 27 of the ICCPR. Although Article 14 of the European Conven-
tion safeguards against discrimination 97 and Article 10 protects an in-
dividual's freedom of expression, 98 this does not add up to an
affirmative protection of an individual's right to enjoy his or her cul-
ture, language or religion.
In its current form, the only linguistic rights that can be inter-
preted from the European Convention can perhaps best be divided
into two categories: rights of criminal procedure and education. 9 9 Ar-
ticle 5(2), first and foremost, guarantees an arrested individual's right
to be promptly informed of the charges against him or her in a lan-
guage the arrested party understands,oo while Article 6(3) goes even
further in providing for an interpreter, free of cost, if the arrested indi-
vidual "cannot understand or speak the language used in court."10 1
However, it must be noted that these rights are certainly limited to
rights of procedure, meant to alleviate any discrimination or disad-
vantage that a linguistic minority might face as a result of language
but not extending to, say, a substantive right to be heard in one's own
language. l0 2
A linguistic minority's right to an education is likewise restricted
under Article 2, which provides that "[nlo person shall be denied the
right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes
in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the
right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity
95. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European
Convention].
96. Id. art. 25. For more on the petitioning process, see Furtado, supra note 39, at
342-46.
97. European Convention, supra note 95, art. 14.
98. Id. art. 10.
99. Furtado notes that, in addition to criminal procedure and education rights, lan-
guage rights are also "implicated by the 'right to private and family life' under
Article 8, freedom of religion under Article 9, and the right to freedom of expres-
sion under Article 10." Furtado, supra note 39, at 350.
100. European Convention, supra note 95, art. 5, para. 2.
101. Id. art. 6, para. 3.
102. Furtado, supra note 39, at 350.
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with their own religious and philosophical convictions."103 Although
providing for an individual's right to an education, European Court
decisions have not interpreted Article 2 to include a right to education
in an individual's native language. In one case, for example, a group
of Belgian French speakers challenged the fact that State-provided ed-
ucation did not allow for teaching in the group's native language
(French, as opposed to Flemish).104 While the Court reiterated that
the State was required to educate minorities like other citizens, it
found the State free of any requirement to respect the parent's linguis-
tic preferences, even in enclaves where a minority language consti-
tuted a considerable percentage of the population.105
Continuing the European trend of broad linguistic protections is
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
("Framework Convention"). Signed in February 1995 by twenty-two
members of the Council of Europe, the Framework Convention
broadly aimed at guaranteeing certain freedoms in relation to minor-
ity languages as the first international convention on minorities.106
Although the regional nature of the Framework Convention has been
widely noted as one of its strengths,1 0 7 it is worthy to note that its
regional focus has potentially limited its significance on a global scale.
Setting out the Framework Convention's basic protection for linguistic
minorities, Article 10(1) stipulates that States recognize the right of
persons belonging to national minorities "to use freely and without in-
terference his or her minority language, in private and in public,
orally and in writing."1os When this right is encroached upon, the
Framework Convention compels the State to "adopt, where necessary,
adequate measures in order to promote, in all areas of economic, so-
cial, political and cultural life, full and effective equality between per-
sons belonging to a national minority and those belonging to the
majority." 10 9 States are also obligated to "create the conditions neces-
sary for the effective participation of persons belonging to national mi-
norities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, in
particular those affecting them."11o
The Framework Convention's linguistic protection extends to a
choice of language in the arena of business and administration, with
103. Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 2, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
104. Louis HENKIN ET AL., HuMAN RIGHTS 1183-85 (1999)
105. Id.
106. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, opened for sig-
nature Feb. 1, 1995, Europ. T.S. No. 157 (entered into force Feb. 1, 1998) [herein-
after Framework Convention].
107. Kurban supra note 31, at 157-59.
108. Framework Convention, supra note 106, art. 10, para. 1.
109. Id. art. 4, para. 2.
110. Id. art. 15.
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Article 11(2) providing that "every person belonging to a national mi-
nority has the right to display in his or her minority language signs,
inscriptions and other information of a private nature visible to the
public."111 Article 11(2) prohibits the State from any restrictions on
the use of a minority language as a means of communication; it does
not, however, prevent the State from requiring the additional use of
the majority language in circumstances where it sees fit, as in where
it would affect the enjoyment of the rights of others in the citizenry.
Paragraph 69 of the companion Explanatory Report to the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities says as much,
allowing the State to, on the basis of a legitimate public interest, re-
quire the additional and supplementary use of an official or majority
language. 112 And because Article 10(2) obligates the States to "make
... possible the [use of] minority language in relations [with] adminis-
trative authorities," these Framework provisions allow not just for the
linguistic respect and cultural maintenance of the minority group, but
also permit the group's full participation in political, economic and so-
cial life.113
The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages
("ECRML") was adopted in 1992 for the protection and promotion of
historical regional and minority languages in Europe. 1 14 Article 7(1)
compels its signatories to base their laws and legislation on "the recog-
nition of the regional or minority languages as an expression of cul-
tural wealth" with the goal of engaging in "resolute action to promote
regional or minority languages in order to safeguard them."1 15 Article
7(2) of the ECRML takes care to note that the attention paid to lin-
guistic survival does not constitute reverse discrimination towards the
linguistic majority:
[T]he adoption of special measures in favour of regional or minority languages
aimed at promoting equality between the users of these languages and the
rest of the population or which take due account of their specific conditions is
not considered to be an act of discrimination against the users of more widely-
used languages. 1 1
6
The ECRML lends support to the idea of providing a significant share
of State financial resources to the goal of supporting, maintaining and
promoting the linguistic survival of its minority groups, a task that
can be easily accomplished through a variety of means: through gov-
111. Id. art. 11, para. 2.
112. Explanatory Report to the Framework Convention on the Protection of National
Minorities, para. 69, available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Reports/
Html/157.htm.
113. Framework Convention, supra note 106, art. 10, para. 2.
114. European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, Nov. 5, 1992, Europ. T.S.
No. 148.
115. Id. art. 7, para. 1.
116. Id. art. 7, para. 2.
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ernment subsidies, public benefits, and even targeted tax benefits, for
instance. On this basis, Article 9 of the ECRML pushes for the con-
ducting of all judicial proceedings, to the extent possible and feasible,
in the regional or minority language.117
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
("OSCE") was initially established as the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe ("CSCE") in 1973 as way to further economic
cooperation among communist countries."18 The collapse of commu-
nism, however, required a redefinition of the CSCE's role in the inter-
national community, as well as a renaming. Thus, the OSCE was
born in 1995 as a regional arrangement under the United Nations
Charter (Chap. VII) that has, in recent years, taken on an increasingly
international dimension with member States from Europe, Central
Asia and North America.11 9 The OSCE proved to be instrumental in
establishing important commitments for the linguistic protection of
minorities, such as the Copenhagen Document of 1990 and the Vienna
Declaration of 1993.120 For instance, paragraph 32 of the Copenhagen
Document promoted the idea of linguistic rights for minorities using
their native language in both the public and private sphere, being as
specific as outlining the right to have access to and exchange informa-
tion in said language: "The participating States will protect the ethnic,
cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities on
their territory and create conditions for the promotion of that
identity."12 '
Paragraph 31 goes a step further in obligating the States to "adopt,
where necessary, special measures for the purpose of ensuring to per-
sons belonging to national minorities full equality with the other citi-
zens in the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental
freedoms."122 And Paragraph 35 bestowed even more affirmative du-
ties upon the signatories:
The participating states note the efforts undertaken to protect and create con-
ditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious iden-
tity of certain national minorities by establishing, as one of the possible means
117. Id. art. 9. See also Article 7(3) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe's Recommendation 1201, which provides: "In regions in which substantial
numbers of a national minority are settled, the persons belonging to a national
minority shall have the right to use their mother tongue in their contacts with
the administrative authorities and in proceedings before the courts and legal au-
thorities." EUR. PARL. Ass., Recommendation 1201, art. 7, para. 3, 44th Sess.
(Feb. 1, 1993).
118. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 46, at 791-94.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 792.
121. Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe, Copenhagen, Den., June 5-29, 1990, Document of the Copenhagen
Meeting, para. 32, http://www.osce.org/documentsodihr/1990/06/13992_en.pdf.
122. Id. para. 31.
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to achieve these aims, appropriate local or autonomous administrations corre-
sponding to the specific historical and territorial circumstances of such minor-
ities and in accordance with the policies of the State concerned.
1 2 3
The evolution of European linguistic protections largely parallels
that of the international community-an early focus on individualistic
protections against nondiscrimination and freedom of expression have
given way in recent years to the recognition of the value of linguistic
diversity and the need for its protection. European linguistic protec-
tions are the cutting-edge of linguistic rights discourse, and serve as
an example of how a plurality of languages can be supported under
regional agreements without resulting in political division.
V. CONCLUSION: LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
Compared to both Europe and Canada above, the linguistic history
of the United States provides an interesting case scenario in which to
examine the potential linguistic protections have of success. The
United States prides itself highly in its immigrant origins and plural-
istic background, in its ability to welcome and accept people of all cul-
tures into its melting pot. The Constitutional Congress, for instance,
made a conscious decision to issue several of our country's most histor-
ically significant documents, like the Articles of Confederation, in Ger-
man and French.1 2 4 Unlike the Canadian example above, the
population of the United States has never doubted the reign or legiti-
macy of the English language. Although language diversity was an
issue since before the American Revolution,1 25 the dominion of En-
glish has never seriously been threatened. And yet, in the eyes of
many, the United States is in the midst of a cultural war, a linguistic
invasion of sorts where our very way of life is endangered by a Span-
ish-speaking minority.
Despite the impression that this is a recent phenomenon, this
Spanish-speaking constituency has a historical presence that predates
the United States' claim of sovereignty over said population. What
has coincided with the presence of the official English movement, how-
ever, has been a rapid rise in low-wage labor immigration from Mex-
ico, primarily, but also from Central America. Immigration analysts
disagree as to whether this immigration will continue to increase-
some suggest the economic development in Mexico will lead to less
migration to the U.S., while others see the U.S. demand for cheap la-
bor remaining stable, if not increasing, which would continue to at-
123. Id. para. 35.
124. Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An Essay on American Languages, Cul-
tural Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REV. 269, 285-86 (1992);
JAMES CRAWFORD, HOLD YOUR TONGUE 37 (1992).
125. James C. Stalker, Official English or English Only, in 66 THE REFERENCE SHELF,
No. 2, 44, 46-49 (Bee Gallegos ed., 1994).
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tract labor from Mexico. 126 The link between proponents of a stricter
immigration policy and official English legislation appears to be rela-
tively strong, so an increase in immigration is likely to lead to more
organizational and legislative opinions on whether to institute official
English policies. Regardless of whether Hispanic immigration in-
creases, the historical presence of Spanish-speakers, recent immigra-
tion and the survival of ethnic/linguistic enclaves will serve to ensure
that the language issue continues to be a political issue.
Unlike the linguistic assimilation that generally characterized pre-
vious generations of immigrants, current linguistic minorities have
generally been successful in ensuring the survival of their language.
The 1980 census had Spanish-speakers constituting nearly half of all
of the minority population, 12 7 and the numbers are only increasing as
a result of a high level of Hispanic immigration 12S and a high birth
rate among the Hispanic community. 129 While previous immigrants
had to cross vast stretches of ocean, the geographical proximity of
Mexico ensures that the largest Spanish-speaking minority bloc will
continue to enjoy easy access to the country's culture.13o But on the
whole, the U.S. Spanish-speaking population has in common with pre-
vious immigrants its eventual assimilation, albeit at a slower pace-
first generation Hispanic immigrants incur the cost of learning En-
glish as a second language (reading fluently in roughly ten years and
speaking fluently within fifteen), the second generation tends to be
successfully bilingual, and the third generation is generally
monolingual.131
And yet, a movement to make English the "official language" of the
United States has gained rapid speed-already several States and the
federal government have begun drafting and, in some cases, already
succeeded in passing legislation to restrict linguistic minorities from
using their native tongue. The push to have English officially sanc-
126. U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform, Binational Study: Migration Between
Mexico and the United States (1997), http://www.utexas.edulbj/uscir/binational]
full-report.pdf; Vernon M. Briggs Jr., Immigration Policy and the U.S. Economy:
An Institutional Perspective, 30 J. ECON. ISSUES 371 (1996).
127. Dorothy Waggoner, Language Minorities in the United States in the 1980s: The
Evidence from the 1980 Census, in LANGUAGE DIVERSITY 79-80 (Sandra Lee Mc-
Kay & Sau-ling Cynthia Wong eds., 1988).
128. Robert Pear, Hispanic Population Growing 5 Times as Fast as the Rest of U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1987, at Al, A28; see also Felicity Barringer, Hispanic Pop-
ulation Passes 20 Million, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 1989, at A20.
129. Pear, supra note 128.
130. See generally Hispanics: More People than Power, ECONOMIST, Sept. 17, 1988, at
32, 33. Cf. THOMAS SOWELL, ETHNIC AMERICA 243, 276 (1981).
131. Mireya Navarro, Pop Culture Blunts Immigrant Children's Taste for Spanish,
Hous. CHRON., Aug. 31, 1996, at 16; Alejandro Portes & Richard Schauffler, Lan-
guage and the Second Generation: Bilingualism Yesterday and Today, 28 INT'L
MIGRATION REV. 640, 643-45 (1994).
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tioned as the national language began relatively recently in 1981 with
Senator S.I. Hayakawa's introduction of his English Language
Amendment to the Constitution.' 3 2 After the amendment's failure,
various state legislatures took up the cause of "Official English" to va-
rying stages of success. Federal interest in the matter revived in the
early 1990s with the election of a Republican Congress, and several
proposals have been submitted since. The most restrictive of these
proposals would lead to the dissolution of current laws mandating
Spanish-language election ballots and supporting Spanish-language
education, while the least restrictive would require English to be used
in federal services and operations.' 33 The United States got closest to
a federally-sanctioned language on August 1996, when House Bill 123,
the English Language Empowerment Act of 1996, was passed.13 4 Al-
though the bill eventually died in committee in the Senate, the fact
that official English legislation had enough support in the first place
to win House approval is a testament to society's support of an official
language policy.
If eventually passed, official English legislation runs the risk of un-
dermining important linguistic protections that currently safeguard
the rights of minorities. For instance, the Voting Rights Act of 1965
contains provisions requiring ballots in languages other than English
when (1) a minority group consists of more than five percent of citi-
zens of voting age and (2) the jurisdiction illiteracy rate exceeds the
national rate.' 3 5 Likewise, the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission ("EEOC") has interpreted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 to include language restrictions in a workplace environment. As
a result of the Fifth Circuit's confusion over the matter in Garcia v.
Gloor,i36 the EEOC created the "Guidelines on Discrimination Be-
cause of National Origin,"137 which explicitly prohibit workplace regu-
lations on language as discrimination based on an individual's
national origin:
The primary language of an individual is often an essential national origin
characteristic. Prohibiting employees at all times, in the workplace, from
speaking their primary language or the language they speak most comforta-
bly, disadvantages an individual's employment opportunities on the basis of
national origin. It may also create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and
132. S.J. Res. 72, 97th Cong. (1981).
133. Compare Language of Government Act of 1997, S. 323, 105th Cong. (1997); and
Bill Emerson English Language Empowerment Act of 1997, H.R. 123, 105th
Cong. (1997); and Bill Emerson Language of Government Act of 1996, H.R. 123,
104th Cong. (1996), with National Language Act of 1997, H.R. 1005, 105th Cong.
(1997); and National Language Act of 1995, H.R. 1005, 104th Cong. (1995).
134. H.R. 123, 142 CONG. REC. H9725-04 (1996).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la (1994).
136. 618 F.2d 264, 268, n.1 (5th Cir. 1980).
137. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7 (1980).
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intimidation based on national origin which would result in a discriminatory
working environment. 138
Likewise, federal statutes and case law currently impose an affirma-
tive obligation on school districts to provide some degree of instruction
in a language other than English to students whose primary language
is not English on the theory that the failure to do so denies certain
students a "meaningful opportunity" to public education, as required
by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. 139
While Congress has not yet enacted any kind of official English
legislation, the majority of States have responded to the sentiment by
drafting, proposing and/or passing legislation officially endorsing-
and in some cases even requiring-the use of English. At latest count,
twenty-three states have passed some sort of legislation declaring En-
glish the official language.140 Similar to the proposed federal legisla-
tion, state statutes and constitutional amendments vary widely as to
the restrictions placed on the speakers of minority languages. On the
one hand the Kentucky, Illinois, Indiana and Missouri statutes, to
name a few, constitute little more than an official endorsement of the
English language.141 At the other extreme is legislation following
California's footsteps, broadly requiring the state to do all that is nec-
essary and feasible to enhance and preserve the role of English as the
official language. 142 Likewise, Nebraska's Constitution requires that
"all official proceedings, records and publications shall be in such lan-
guage, and the common school branches shall be taught in said lan-
guage in public, private and denominational and parochial
schools." 143 Perhaps most extreme of all is Article XXVIII of the Ari-
zona Constitution, passed in 1988 as a ballot initiative, which prohib-
ited the "state from using or requiring the use of languages other than
English."144 The constitutionality of the amendment was challenged
by a bilingual Hispanic employee in the Department of Administra-
tion who had to refrain from speaking Spanish to her unilingual Span-
ish-speaking clients.145 The Ninth Circuit struck down the Arizona
amendment as a violation of the First Amendment, but the Supreme
Court reversed the decision on mootness because Yniquez had left her
job.146 While the legal state of Article XXVIII is uncertain, it clearly
138. Id. § 1606.7(a).
139. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
140. Lori A. McMullen & Charlene R. Lynde, The "Official English" Movement and the
Demise of Diversity: The Elimination of Federal Judicial and Statutory Minority
Language Rights, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 789, 794-95 (1997).
141. Id. at 795-96 n.56.
142. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 6; see also ALA. CONST. amend. 509 (1990); ARiZ. CONST.
art. XXVIII (1988).
143. NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 27.
144. ARiz. CONST. art. XXVIII.
145. Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 1995).
146. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
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stands as representative of the most restrictive official English provi-
sions currently enacted.
The face of linguistic minority protections has changed, at both the
international and regional levels, within the past several decades.
While throughout history human rights law has been framed in indi-
vidualistic speech and focused on universal protections, the breakup of
the Soviet Union, the increasing globalization of the world's economies
and the empowerment of ethnic minorities has made the world recon-
sider a more active State role when it comes to the protection of lin-
guistic minorities. At the international level this is perhaps best
represented by an increasingly popular reading of ICCPR's Article 27
to include an affirmative duty of the State to promote, support and
ensure the survival of a minority community's language. Even so, the
international agreements discussed herein, as forward-thinking as
they may be, suffer from the same illnesses that plague most interna-
tional documents and institutions-the strength of their implementa-
tion is directly tied to the commitment of the signatories. As such,
while the evolution of the international human rights agenda can be
seen with promise, international linguistic protections offer little more
than a guide as to where minority protections should go next.
At the regional level the examples of Canada and Europe offer a
compelling insight as to how far linguistic protections have been cre-
ated and implemented, and with what consequences. While Europe
has been much more successful in protection of linguistic minorities in
recent years, an application of the European model to the United
States must be somewhat tempered by the recognition that what
works in an association of European nation-states might have differ-
ent consequences when applied to one nation. Likewise, while Ca-
nada's bilingual founding best mirrors the pluralistic origins of the
United States, policymakers should be wary of avoiding the same out-
come-a nation divided along linguistic lines. Applying the Canadian
approach to the United States without accounting for the differences
in culture and politics could very well lead to exactly the outcome
feared by proponents of Official English policies.
The current status of the Official English policies appears to re-
semble a blend of European and Canadian aims along a tiered system
of protections at the federal and state level. Federal laws like the Vot-
ing Rights Act represent the first tier of linguistic protections and are
applicable to all the states within the Union without fail. The second
tier of protections is at the state level, where states differ as to the
degree of protection given to linguistic minorities: some states simply
give a nominal endorsement of the English language while others go
as far as restricting the use of non-English languages to the point of
having their constitutionality questioned. So far, the United States
has avoided the serious political divide that characterizes the Cana-
20091
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
dian situation, perhaps because linguistic concerns cannot so easily be
divided along territorial lines, or perhaps as a result of a stronger
sense of national unity. Whatever the cause of the differences, the
two-tiered system has so far worked for the United States.
In planning for the future of linguistic protections in the United
States, policymakers and legislators should consider the possibility of
a third route when choosing between an official language policy and
the protection of linguistic minority rights-one where neither is nec-
essarily exclusive of the other. This perspective would allow for the
sharing of public space between a plurality of languages; in education,
for instance, minority languages could share public space with the "of-
ficial" language through efficiently implemented bilingual or multil-
ingual programs.14 7 Something similar is implemented in a three-
step fashion and appears to be working in the heavily multi-lingual
State of India: state organizations operate in a state-sanctioned lan-
guage, while a number of national languages have official status in
certain territories, and yet more regional languages are used for a va-
riety of other purposes.148 Similarly, the United Nations has recog-
nized six languages as "official" languages but makes the distinction of
"working" languages: while English and French are the working lan-
guages of the Secretariat, English, French and Spanish are the work-
ing languages of the Economic and Social Council.149
But the alternative third path above leaves the question of na-
tional unity unanswered. India, for instance, is multi-lingual to the
degree that it can be said to suffer from communication paralysis:
with over eight hundred languages spoken nationwide, individuals re-
siding in the same state are often not able to communicate with one
another. 1 50 Additionally, the method by which certain languages are
selected over others, as well as the varying level of official recognition,
is far from being universally agreed upon-for instance, some states
select those languages spoken by a numerically significant portion of
the population, while others choose to correlate significance with the
group's political power.151 While definitely an option worth consider-
ing, one should also be careful not to neglect the flaws that accompany
it.
147. Addis, supra note 35, at 784-786.
148. Id. at 786 (citing T.N. Dhar, Language Planning and Development: Problems of
Legislation Amidst Diversity, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COLLO-
QUIUM ON LANGUAGE PLANNING 238, 238-54 (Lorne Laforge ed., 1986)).
149. Id. at 786-87 (citing Rules of Procedure Concerning Languages, G.A. Res. 2(1),
U.N. GAOR 1st Comm., 1st Sess., Annex, at 5 (1946)).
150. See The Official Language Resolution, Department of Official Language, Govern-
ment of India, http://rajbhasha.gov.in/dolresolutioneng.htm (last visited October
21, 2008).
151. Addis, supra note 14, at 667 (citing Capotorti Report, supra note 32).
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Historically, the international community has been hesitant in ad-
dressing the protection of linguistic minority rights and, when it has
done so, has left enough flexibility to the States to the extent that it
renders such protections merely nominal and ineffective. While inter-
national agreements have served as useful guides for the drafting of
regional linguistic protections, the regional approach has fared much
better in implementing said protections. In proposing a regionally-fo-
cused approach to the protection of linguistic minority rights, such
rights should be examined with the context of the minority group's
greater and larger participation in society. I do not propose a solution
where the end result would lead to the sectionist conflict that charac-
terizes the Canadian situation, but rather one that would better en-
courage, promote and support linguistic protections while ensuring
the full political and social involvement of the minority group.
The United States should strive to balance being cognizant of the
contributions of the linguistic minority community and striving to pro-
tect the nation's linguistic diversity, on the one hand, while on the
other making sure to provide the training and opportunities linguistic
minorities need to learn English. The most restrictive official English
policies focus only on one side of the equal and forget the other; while
there is certainly some value to recognizing the importance of a com-
mon language, it is ignorant to think that unilingual linguistic minori-
ties refuse to learn English and participate in American society. On
the contrary, most immigrants learn the majority language within one
or two generations when given the proper support and educational
tools. The promotion of the English language and American culture is
certainly a worthwhile goal, and one that should be pursued further-
but not at the cost of the protection and promotion of language diver-
sity in the United States.
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